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Abstract
The neutral valuation approach for contingent claims in incomplete markets is
based on the assumption that investors are identical utility maximizers and that deriva-
tive supply and demand are balanced. It is closely related to (marginal) utility-based
pricing in the sense of Hugonnier et al. (2005), where however only buy-and-hold in-
vestments in the derivative are possible.
This paper contains four results: Firstly, it is shown that neutral derivative prices
exist in discrete-time markets with finite time horizon. They are characterized as mar-
tingales relative to certain finitely additive set functions. Secondly, it may happen that
not any static utility-based derivative price can be extended to yield a neutral price
process. Thirdly, neutral derivative prices may not exist in continuous-time markets.
Finally, we consider the situation of finite utility on the whole real line.
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1 Introduction
This paper concerns the derivative pricing problem in incomplete markets. More specifi-
cally, suppose that the price processes of a number of underlyings are exogenously given.
We are interested in the initial price or even the whole price process of one or several con-
tingent claims, which are given in terms of their terminal payoff at maturity. Unless we are
in the fortunate situation of a complete market model, arbitrage arguments typically do not
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suffice to fix the prices resp. price processes of these options uniquely. Stronger assumptions
have to be made if one wants to pursue this goal.
Relying on classical principles in economic theory, utility-based approaches have re-
ceived a lot of attention in recent years. They all involve assumptions on the preferences of
market participants, which are expressed in terms of utility functions. However, they differ
considerably in their economic viewpoint and hence in their precise axiomatic framework.
Utility-based indifference pricing (cf. e.g. [12, 6]) takes the perspective of a particular
counterparty and fixes the number of shares of the claim (say, δ = 1 for an option buyer or
δ = −1 for an option seller). The indifference premium or reservation price is a price such
that the optimal expected utility among all portfolios containing the prespecified number
of options coincides with the optimal expected utility among all portfolios without options.
Put differently, the investor is indifferent to including the option into the portfolio. Note
that utility indifference pricing is an asymmetric, static, size-dependent concept, i.e. it dis-
tinguishes between buyer and seller, does not allow for intermediate trades of the contingent
claim, and depends on the number of options δ.
[5] and [18] consider the limit of utility indifference prices if δ tends to 0. More precisely,
they propose to call an initial option price fair if the investor is marginally indifferent versus
including the option in the portfolio or not. One may call these prices marginal utility
indifference prices.
The valuation concepts discussed in [9, 16, 17, 13] are rather based on symmetric, size-
independent axioms, which carry a partial equilibrium flavour. Assume that a certain deriva-
tive is introduced in zero-net supply into the market. Since any option that is bought has to
be sold by another investor, this leads to a clearing condition for the derivatives market.
We suppose that all investors in this secondary market are identical utility maximizers with
a given profile. If they behave optimally, the option prices must be such that the utility-
optimal portfolio of the average investor contains no contingent claim. Such prices are
called neutral in [16, 17] and marginal utility-based prices in [13]. Recall that the prices
of the underlyings are assumed to be exogenously given and that they are not affected by
derivative investors. Therefore these concepts differ somewhat from general equilibrium
theory applied to the market as a whole.
Neutral prices of [16, 17] and marginal utility-based prices in the sense of [13] differ
as far as investment opportunities in the derivative are concerned. [13] consider only buy-
and-hold strategies in the claim, whereas intermediate trades are allowed in [16, 17] (cf.
also [10, 15] as earlier references). Nevertheless, the main idea is the same: The option is
assumed to be traded at a price such that its presence does not lead to additional utility.
By way of duality, portfolio optimization problems are linked to some dual minimiza-
tion problems in the set of equivalent martingale measures or some related set of stochastic
processes which generalizes the class of density processes of equivalent martingale mea-
sures. These measures can be interpreted as pricing rules for contingent claims. It has been
observed that the marginal and neutral derivative prices of [5, 18, 16, 17, 13] are obtained as
expectations under the dual minimizer if the latter is a true equivalent martingale measure.
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This measure is called neutral pricing measure in [16, 17]. In general, however, the dual
minimizer in the sense of [19] need not be a martingale, which means that the neutral pricing
measure fails to exist. In the language of [3], the dual minimization problem is solved by
some non-unique finitely additive set function. [13] investigate the existence and uniqueness
of marginal utility-based prices in this general case. It turns out that the non-uniqueness of
the dual minimizer always leads to non-unique utility-based prices for some claims.
In this paper a similar analysis is undertaken for neutral derivative pricing in the dynamic
sense where contingent claims can be traded at any time. Since the static concept of [13]
and the dynamic version considered here coincide in one-period models, the results of [13]
show that uniqueness of neutral price processes does not hold in general either.
In Section 2 we show that neutral derivative prices exist in multiperiod discrete-time
markets. They are characterized as martingales relative to some finitely additive set function
which solves the dual minimization problem in [3].
However, it may happen that not all dual minimizers in [3] can be used as a pricing
rule for derivatives. In this case, the set of marginal utility-based prices in the sense of [13]
may be strictly larger than the corresponding set of initial neutral prices. This leads to a
phenomenon which seems paradoxical on first glance: If the claim is traded at a certain
price at time 0 only, then the utility maximizers do not profit from its presence. But if a
market for the claim exists also between time 0 and maturity T , trading the claim will lead
to additional utility – no matter how the price process strictly between 0 and T is chosen
(cf. Example 3.3).
Moreover, we show that in continuous time even the existence of neutral prices may
break down: In an arbitrage-free market with finite expected utility, there may be no way
to price a given bounded claim such that the maximal utility is not raised in the extended
market where dynamic trading of the claim is possible (cf. Example 3.4).
The situation is different for utility functions that are finite on the whole real line. In this
case the dual minimizer is always a true probability measure which is absolutely continuous
with respect to the original measure (cf. [2] and references therein). This leads to essentially
unique neutral price processes. To be more precise, some non-uniqueness may still occur on
the set where the density process of the dual minimizer vanishes. Moreover, neutral price
processes may fail to exist if the dual minimizer is strictly absolutely continuous. This is
discussed in Section 4.
We use the dot notation for stochastic integrals. IfX is a semimartingale, L(X) denotes
the set ofX-integrable predictable processes in the sense of [14], III.6.17. Superscripts refer
generally to coordinates of a vector or vector-valued process rather than powers.
2 Existence of neutral price processes
Before we turn to the existence of neutral derivative price processes in discrete time, let us
introduce a general setup which makes sense in continuous time as well. Fix a terminal date
T ∈ R+ and a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ). We distinguish two kinds
3
of securities in the markets, namely underlyings and derivatives, which can both be traded
dynamically. The discounted price process (S1, . . . , Sm) of the underlyings is assumed to
be an Rm-valued semimartingale which is given beforehand.
Moreover, let boundedFT -measurable random variables H1, . . . , Hn represent the dis-
counted terminal payoff of n contingent claims. Their price process has yet to be deter-
mined. At this stage, we call any bounded Rn-valued semimartingale (Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n)
derivatives price process if Sm+iT = H
i for i = 1, . . . , n.
Altogether, S = (S1, . . . , Sm+n) is the discounted price process of them+ n securities
in the market. Trading strategies ψ ∈ L(S) are called admissible if their discounted value
process is bounded from below, i.e. there exists some c ∈ R such that ψ • S ≥ c outside
some P -null set.
We assume that investors are identical utility maximizers with initial endowment v ∈
(0,∞). Their preferences are modelled by a strictly concave utility function u : R →
R ∪ {−∞} which is continuously differentiable on (0,∞) and satisfies u(x) = −∞ for
x < 0, limx→0 u′(x) = ∞, limx→∞ u′(x) = 0, and lim supx→∞ xu
′(x)
u(x)
< 1 (i.e. it has
asymptotic elasticity strictly less than 1 in the sense of [19], Definition 2.2).
An admissible trading strategy ϕ is called optimal if it maximizes the expected utility of
terminal wealth ψ 7→ E(u(v + ψ • ST )) over all admissible strategies ψ ∈ L(S). Here, we
set E(u(v+ψ • ST )) := −∞ if E(−u(v+ψ • ST )∨0) =∞. We assume that the maximal
expected utility which is achievable by trading in the underlyings is finite and attained by
some strategy, i.e.
sup
{
E(u(v + ψ • ST )) : ψ admissible with ψi = 0 for i = m+ 1, . . . ,m+ n
}
= E(u(v + ϕ • ST )) <∞ (2.1)
for some admissible ϕ with ϕi = 0 for i = m+ 1, . . . ,m+ n.
Proposition 2.1 Under condition (2.1) the semimartingale (S1, . . . , Sm) satisfies the con-
dition of no free lunch with vanishing risk (NFLVR) in the sense of [7].
PROOF. Assume that NFLVR does not hold. Then there exist some f ∈ L0+(Ω,F , P ) \ {0}
and some sequence of admissible strategies ψ(n), n ∈ N which trade only with S1, . . . , Sm
and satisfy f ≤ 1
n
+ ψ(n) • ST . Let ϕ be an optimal strategy for S1, . . . , Sm in the
sense of (2.1) and set ϕ(n) := (1 − 2
vn
)ϕ + ψ(n). For n ≥ 2/v the strategies ϕ(n) are
admissible. Moreover, v + ϕ(n) • ST ≥ (v + ϕ • ST ) ∧ v2 , which implies that the se-
quence u(v + ϕ(n) • ST ) is bounded from below by an integrable random variable. Since
lim infn→∞ u
(
v + ϕ(n) • ST
) ≥ u (v + ϕ • ST + f) almost surely, Fatou’s lemma and the
monotonicity of u yield
lim inf
n→∞
E(u(v + ϕ(n) • ST )) ≥ E(u(v + ϕ • ST + f)) > E(u(v + ϕ • ST )),
which contradicts the optimality of ϕ in (2.1). Thus NFLVR holds. 
If contingent claims are in zero net supply and if their market clears, we end up with
neutral prices in the following sense:
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Definition 2.2 We call derivative price processes Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n neutral price processes
if there exists an admissible strategy ϕ which is optimal for S = (S1, . . . , Sm+n) and satis-
fies ϕm+1 = . . . = ϕm+n = 0.
In finite probability spaces neutral derivative prices are obtained as conditional expecta-
tions under some specific equivalent martingale measure (cf. [16]). Often – but not always –
this extends to continuous-time semimartingale markets. This neutral pricing measure plays
a key role in the dual approach to the portfolio optimization problem in the primary market.
In order to obtain existence and duality results in a general semimartingale model, [19] and
[3] go beyond the set of equivalent martingale measures. We follow here [3] by considering
the dual space (L∞)∗+, which can be identified with the set of nonnegative finitely additive
set functions (cf. [8], Theorem IV.8.16).
For Q ∈ (L∞)∗+ the operator 〈Q, ·〉 can be extended to any random variable which is
bounded from below, namely by setting 〈Q,X〉 := limn→∞〈Q,X ∧ n〉 ∈ (−∞,∞]. If
〈Q, |X|〉 < ∞, we set 〈Q,X〉 := 〈Q,X+〉 − 〈Q,X−〉 for arbitrary random variables X .
Moreover, recall that any Q ∈ (L∞)∗+ can be uniquely written as Q = Qr + Qs with some
measureQr (the regular part) and some purely finitely additive set functionQs (the singular
part, cf. [8], Definition III.7.7 and Theorem III.7.8 for this Yosida-Hewitt decomposition).
Qr is absolutely continuous with respect to P .
In Theorem 2.5 it is shown that neutral price processes are martingales relative to neutral
set functions, which are defined as follows:
Definition 2.3 In this definition we exceptionally consider the market without contingent
claims, i.e. S = (S1, . . . , Sm) denotes the price process of the underlyings and ϕ, ψ below
are Rm-valued processes.
Let Q ∈ (L∞)∗+ with 〈Q, 1〉 = 1 and denote by Q = Qr + Qs its Yosida-Hewitt
decomposition. We call Q neutral set function if there exists some admissible strategy ϕ
and some y ∈ (0,∞) such that
1.
y
dQr
dP
= u′(v + ϕ • ST ),
2. 〈Q,ψ • ST 〉 ≤ 0 for all admissible strategies ψ,
3. 〈Q,ϕ • ST 〉 = 0,
4. 〈Qs, v + ϕ • ST 〉 = 0.
We denote byQ the set of neutral set functions. It is nonempty by [3].
Q is the set of dual minimizers in the extended dual domain from [3]. Note that the regular
parts of the elements ofQ coincide. If Q is a neutral set function, then the corresponding ϕ
is an optimal strategy for (S1, . . . , Sm).
It is natural to define Q-martingales in the following way:
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Definition 2.4 Let Q be a nonnegative finitely additive set function with 〈Q, 1〉 = 1. An
adapted process X is called Q-martingale if 〈Q, |Xt|〉 <∞ and
〈Q,Xt1A〉 = 〈Q,XT1A〉
for any t ∈ [0, T ] and any A ∈ Ft. Multivariate martingales are defined componentwise as
usual.
In contrast to probability measures, there may not exist a Q-martingale X with terminal
value H for any given bounded random variable H (cf. Example 3.3). If Q is a neutral set
function and hence Qr ∼ P , then X is unique (up to a modification) if it exists at all. In
finite discrete time the recursive procedure
XT := H, Xt−1 := EQ(Xt|Ft−1) (2.2)
yields such a Q-martingale if Q is a probability measure. Conditional expectations may not
exist for finitely additive set functions. Nevertheless, a similar construction is crucial for the
proof of Theorem 2.5 although it does not necessarily lead to a Q-martingale.
From now on we work in a discrete-time market, i.e. the time domain is {0, 1, . . . , T}
rather than [0, T ]. Our first main result treats existence of neutral derivative price processes
and shows that they are recovered as martingales under neutral set functions.
Theorem 2.5 The set of neutral price processes (Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n) coincides with the set
of Q-martingales having terminal value (H1, . . . , Hn), where Q runs through the set Q
of neutral set functions. This set is nonempty, i.e. for at least one Q ∈ Q there exists a
Q-martingale (Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n) with Sm+iT = H
i for i = 1, . . . , n.
PROOF. For ease of notation we assume m = n = 1 in this proof and we write H := H1.
The general case follows analogously.
Step 1: In the first two steps we show the existence of a neutral derivative price process.
To this end, let Q ∈ Q with corresponding admissible strategy ϕ for S1 and y > 0. We
mimic the recursive definition (2.2) of a martingale for finitely additive set functions. We
start with S2T := H . Suppose that S
2
t is already defined. OnFt−1 define finitely additive set
functions Qt−1, µ+t−1, µ
−
t−1, µt−1 by Qt−1 := Q|Ft−1 and
µt−1(A) := µ+t−1(A)− µ−t−1(A) := 〈Q, (S2t )+1A〉 − 〈Q, (S2t )−1A〉.
Denote by Qt−1 = Qrt−1 + Q
s
t−1 etc. the Yosida-Hewitt decompositions of Qt−1, µ
+
t−1, µ
−
t−1
into a regular and a singular part, respectively. Moreover, set µrt−1 := (µ
+
t−1)
r − (µ−t−1)r
and µst−1 := µt−1 − µrt−1. The regular parts are absolutely continuous to P . From µ±t−1 ≤
‖S2t ‖∞Qt−1 it follows that (µ±t−1)r ≤ ‖S2t ‖∞Qrt−1 (using e.g. [3], Lemma A.1). Hence, we
can define S2t−1 as the bounded Radon-Nikodym derivative of µ
r
t−1 with respect to Q
r
t−1, i.e.
S2t−1 :=
dµrt−1
dQrt−1
.
6
Step 2: We show that S2 is a neutral price process. For any t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} there
exists an increasing sequence (Ak,t)k∈N ofFt-measurable sets with P (Ak,t) ≥ 1− 1/k and
Qst(Ak,t) = 0 = µ
s
t(Ak,t) (cf. [3], Lemma A.1). Thus we have〈
Q,∆S2t 1Ak,t−1∩A
〉
= µrt−1(Ak,t−1 ∩ A)−
〈
Qrt−1,
dµrt−1
dQrt−1
1Ak,t−1∩A
〉
= 0 (2.3)
for t = 1, . . . , T and A ∈ Ft−1. Moreover, the sequence
Tk(ω) := inf{t ≥ 0 : ω 6∈ Ak,t} ∧ T, k ∈ N,
is localizing, i.e. P (Tk = T )→ 1 as k →∞.
For fixed k ∈ N consider the optimization problem
sup
{
E
(
u(v + ψ1 • S1T + ψ
2 • (S2)TkT )
)
: (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ Θ
}
(2.4)
with
Θ :=
{
ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) : ψ2 bounded, ψ ∈ L(S), and v + ψ1 • S1 + ψ2 • (S2)Tk ≥ 0} .
Let ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ Θ. Since ψ2 • S2 is bounded, ψ1 • S1 is bounded from below
and hence 〈Q,ψ1 • S1T 〉 ≤ 0. Equation (2.3) and the boundedness of ψ2 and S2 imply that
〈Q,ψ2 • S2Tk〉 = 0 because ψ2 • S2Tk can be approximated uniformly by linear combinations
of random variables of the form ∆S2t 1Ak,t−1∩A. Therefore we have
〈Q,ψ1 • S1T + ψ2 • S2Tk〉 ≤ 0.
We obtain
E
(
u
(
v + ψ1 • S1T + ψ
2 • S2Tk
) )
≤ E
(
V
(
y
dQr
dP
)
+ y
dQr
dP
(
v + ψ1 • S1T + ψ
2 • S2Tk
))
≤ E
(
V
(
y
dQr
dP
))
+ y
〈
Q, v + ψ1 • S1T + ψ
2 • S2Tk
〉
≤ E
(
V
(
y
dQr
dP
))
+ yv
= E(u(v + ϕ • S1T )),
where V (z) := supx>0(u(x) − xz) denotes the conjugate function of u and the equality is
stated in [3], (4.1). Therefore (ϕ, 0) is optimal for the optimization problem (2.4).
Let ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) be an admissible strategy for S = (S1, S2) with v + ψ • S ≥ 0. Then
(1 − 1
k
)1[[0,Tk∧Rk]]ψ ∈ Θ, where Rk := inf{t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} : |ψ2t+1| ≥ k} ∧ T , and we
have
E
(
u
(
v + ((1− 1
k
)1[[0,Tk∧Rk]]ψ) • (S
1, (S2)Tk)T
))
≥ E
(
u
(v
k
))
> −∞.
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By Lemma 2.2 in [17] the optimality of (ϕ, 0) for problem (2.4) implies that
E
(
u′(v + ϕ • S1T )
(
(1− 1
k
)1[[0,Tk∧Rk]]ψ − (ϕ, 0)
)
• (S1, (S2)Tk)T
)
≤ 0.
Note that Θ does not fit in the requirements of Lemma 2.2, but for the proof it is sufficient
that Θ is convex. ((1− 1
k
)1[[0,Tk∧Rk]]ψ) • ST converges pointwise to ψ • ST for k →∞. By(
(1− 1
k
)1[[0,Tk∧Rk]]ψ
)
• ST ≥ −v
and since u′(v + ϕ • S1T ) and u
′(v + ϕ • S1T )(v + ϕ • S
1
T ) are integrable, Fatou’s lemma
yields that
E
(
u′(v + ϕ • S1T )(ψ − (ϕ, 0)) • ST
)
≤ 0.
Applying the converse implication of [17], Lemma 2.2, it follows that
(ϕ, 0) is optimal for S = (S1, S2) among all ψ ∈ L(S) with v + ψ • S ≥ 0. (2.5)
Let ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) be an admissible strategy for S = (S1, S2) such that v + ψ • S ≥ 0
does not hold. Then E(u(v + ψ • ST )) = −∞ or there exists a one-period arbitrage. But
the latter is impossible in view of (2.5).
Step 3: Let S2 be a Q-martingale with terminal valueH for some Q ∈ Q. We show that
S2 is a neutral derivative price process.
The martingale property implies that 〈Q,∆S2t 1A〉 = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T and any A ∈
Ft−1, which in turn yields that the left-hand side of (2.3) equals 0. The assertion follows
now as in Step 2.
Step 4: Conversely, let S2 be a neutral derivative price process. We show that S2 is a
Q-martingale for some Q ∈ Q.
Since (S1, S2) is a market with finite maximal expected utility, the set Q˜ of neutral set
functions corresponding to the extended market (S1, S2) is nonempty by [3]. Since S2 is
bounded, strategies of the form (ψ1, ψ2) := (0,±1A×{t}) with some t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and
some A ∈ Ft−1 are admissible. Thus ±〈Q,∆S2t 1A〉 = 〈Q,ψ • ST 〉 ≤ 0 and hence S2 is a
Q-martingale for any Q ∈ Q˜ ⊂ Q. 
If Q is a probability measure, then neutral prices are unique (cf. [17], Corollary 3.5).
This does not hold in general: In a one-period market, neutral prices coincide with marginal
utility-based prices put forward by [13]. Theorem 3.1 in the latter paper shows that unique-
ness generally ceases to hold (cf. also Section 3 in this context).
3 Counterexamples
This section contains counterexamples which may seem surprising on first glance. The
first concerns the relation between marginal utility-based prices in the sense of [13] and the
initial values of neutral price processes. The second dashes the hopes to extend Theorem 2.5
to continuous time. Both constructions are based on the one-period Example 5.1’ in [19],
which we sketch briefly for the convenience of the reader:
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Example 3.1 The risky asset S1 starts in S10 = 1. In t = 1 it assumes values (xk)k∈N with
probabilities (pk)k∈N, where e.g. x0 := 2, p0 := 5/6, xk := 2−k, pk := 4−k/2 for k ≥ 1. The
agent is endowed with initial capital v = 1 and strives to maximize her expected logarithmic
utility from terminal wealth. The example is designed such that the optimal terminal wealth
is S11 (buy one risky asset) and E(u
′(S11)(S
1
1 − 1)) = 1− E(1/S11) > 0.
In the context of neutral derivative pricing we consider the following extension:
Example 3.2 In the setup of Example 3.1 we consider a contingent claim whose payoff H
is independent of S11 and satisfies P (H = 0) = 1/2 = P (H = 1). Let S
2
0 denote the price
of this option at time 0. By [17], Lemma 2.2 it remains optimal to buy one share of S1 in
the extended market if and only if
E
(
1
S11
(
(ψ1 − 1)(S11 − 1) + ψ2(H − S20)
)) ≤ 0 (3.1)
holds for all (ψ1, ψ2) with expected utility E(log(1+ψ1(S11−1)+ψ2(H−S20))) > −∞. If
ψ2 ≥ 0, then only −(1−ψ2S20) < ψ1 ≤ 1−ψ2S20 leads to finite expected utility. Similarly,
we must have −(1 + ψ2(1− S20)) < ψ1 ≤ 1 + ψ2(1− S20) for ψ2 < 0. Since the left-hand
side of (3.1) equals
E(1/S11)(
1
2
− S20)ψ2 − (1− E(1/S11)) (1− ψ1)
≤
{
E(1/S11)(
1
2
− S20)ψ2 − (1− E(1/S11))ψ2S20 if ψ2 ≥ 0,
E(1/S11)(
1
2
− S20)ψ2 + (1− E(1/S11))ψ2(1− S20) if ψ2 < 0,
one easily concludes that (1, 0) is an optimal strategy for S = (S1, S2) if and only if
S20 ∈
[
1
2
E(1/S11), 1− 12E(1/S11)
]
.
In view of Theorem 2.5, this interval of neutral prices coincides with[
inf
Q∈Q
〈Q,H〉, sup
Q∈Q
〈Q,H〉
]
,
where Q denotes the set of neutral set functions for S1. From the definition of neutral set
functions it follows that dQ
r
dP
= 1/S11 and hence 〈Qs, 1〉 = 1−E(1/S11) for anyQ ∈ Q. The
independence of H and S11 yields EQr(H) =
1
2
E (1/S11). Since the length of the interval
of neutral prices equals the loss of measure, one easily concludes that 〈Qs, H〉 assumes any
value between 0 and 〈Qs, 1〉. If there was no loss of measure, S20 = 12 would be the unique
neutral price of the claim H .
3.1 Intermediate trades matter
The utility-based valuation concept of [13] is closely connected to neutral pricing. In both
approaches contingent claims are priced such that investment in these derivatives does not
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increase expected utility. The concepts differ in the precise meaning of investment. We
allow for dynamic trading in all securities, whereas this is limited to the underlyings in
[13]. One may expect that marginal utility-based prices in the sense of [13] can always be
extended to neutral price processes. However, this does not hold in general, which may
seem counterintuitive on first glance: No matter how a certain contingent claim is priced
in the periods strictly between time 0 and maturity, dynamic investment in this claim will
always be profitable even though it possesses a marginal utility-based initial price.
Example 3.3 We consider a two-period modification of Example 3.2. The claim H expires
at time t = 2 but the stochastic outcome of the underlying is revealed already at t = 1 (i.e.
S11 = S
1
2 is as in Examples 3.1 and 3.2). Consequently, the filtration (Ft)t=0,1,2 is given by
F0 = {∅,Ω},F1 := σ(S11),F2 := σ(S11 , H). Observe that the set of payoffs of admissible
strategies in the underlying market and the set Q of neutral set functions remains the same
as in Example 3.2. Nevertheless, we obtain now a unique neutral derivative price process
for H , namely S20 = S
2
1 = 1/2:
The existence follows from Theorem 2.5. Denote by S2 an arbitrary neutral derivative
price process. Denote by pik the price S21 of the claimH on the set {S11 = xk}. By Theorem
2.5, we have
pik =
〈Q, 1{S11=xk}H〉
〈Q, 1{S11=xk}〉
for some neutral set function Q ∈ Q. Since the singular part of Q vanishes on {S11 = xk},
we have
pik =
〈Qr, 1{S11=xk}H〉
〈Qr, 1{S11=xk}〉
=
E
(
1
S11
1{S11=xk}H
)
E
(
1
S11
1{S11=xk}
) = 1
2
,
i.e. S21 = 1/2 is the unique neutral derivative price at time 1. Absence of arbitrage or another
application of Theorem 2.5 yields that S20 = 1/2 as well.
Since intermediate trades of the claim are not intended in the approach of [13], Examples
3.2 and 3.3 lead to the same set of marginal utility-based derivative prices S20 . This set of
prices equals the interval of initial neutral prices in Example 3.2 because the two valuation
concepts coincide in one-period markets. Consequently, Example 3.3 shows that there are
marginal utility-based prices S20 which cannot be extended to some neutral price process
(S20 , S
2
1 , S
2
2) with S
2
2 = H . Moreover, there are some Q ∈ Q such that there exists no
Q-martingale with terminal valueH . In particular, the recursive construction in the proof of
Theorem 2.5 does not necessarily lead to a martingale under the neutral set function Q that
was chosen in Step 1.
Recall, however, that these phenomena occur only if the dual minimizer Q fails to be
a probability measure. Otherwise, both the marginal utility-based derivative price and the
neutral price process are unique. They are derived by (conditional) expectation under this
neutral pricing measure Q (cf. [13, 17]).
10
3.2 Continuous-time neutral prices may not exist
We turn now to the question whether Theorem 2.5 can be extended to continuous-time.
Surprisingly, this is not the case as the following example shows. It starts with a market
with one risky security satisfying NFLVR and having finite expected logarithmic utility. In
this market we explicitly construct a bounded claim which does not allow for a neutral price
process.
Example 3.4 Step 1: Denote by X1 a random variable as in Example 3.1, i.e. assuming
the values (xk)k∈N with probabilities (pk)k∈N, where x0 := 2, p0 := 5/6, xk := 2−k,
pk := 4
−k/2 for k ≥ 1. Let 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < t∞ = 1. We construct a model in
countable discrete time t = t0, t1, . . . , t∞, which can be extended to the whole continuous
time interval [0, 1] through the usual right-continuous extension. To this end, let X0 := 1
and
Xt2k+2 := Xt2k+1 :=
{
X1 if X1 ∈ {x0, . . . , xk},
sk if X1 < xk
for k ∈ N, where
sk :=
1
2k(2k−1 + 3)
.
In addition, denote by (Uk)k∈N a sequence of independent binary random variables, also
independent of X1, with P (Uk = 0) = qk = 1− P (Uk = 1), where
qk :=
2−(k+1)
1 + 2−k
.
The filtration (Ftn)n∈N∪{∞} is chosen as
F0 := {∅,Ω},
Ft2k+1 := σ(Xt0 , . . . , Xt2k+1 , U0, . . . , Uk−1),
Ft2k+2 := σ(Xt0 , . . . , Xt2k+2 , U0, . . . , Uk),
F1 := σ(Xt0 , . . . , Xt∞ , U0, U1, . . .).
Define κ0 := inf{k ∈ N : Uk = 0} and observe that σ := t2κ0+2 is a stopping time.
Similarly, let κ1 := inf{k ∈ N : Xt2k+1 = xk} and define the stopping time τ := t2κ1+1. As
risky asset we consider the stopped process S1 := Xσ.
Step 2: We show that S1 satisfies Condition NFLVR. To this end, observe that (1/Xtn)n∈N
is a martingale relative to (Ftn)n∈N (excluding t∞). Set
Yk =
{
(2k+1 + 3)/2 if Uk = 0,
1/2 if Uk = 1
for k ∈ N, which implies that E(Yk) = 1. Moreover, define a uniformly integrable martin-
galeM viaMt1 :=M0 := 1,
Mt2k+3 :=Mt2k+2 :=
k∧κ0∏
i=0
Yi
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for k ∈ N andM1 := (1 + 3/2κ0+1)1{κ0<∞}. If we set
Z :=
M
S1
=
M
Xσ
,
then (Ztn)n∈N is a positive martingale relative to (Ftn)n∈N because M and X change only
in even and odd periods, respectively. Moreover, it converges almost surely to Z1. The
independence of X and σ yields
E(Z1) = E(E(Z1|σ)) =
∑
k∈N
P (σ = t2k+2)
2k+1 + 3
2k+1
E
(
1
Xt2k+2
)
.
Since
P (σ = t2k+2) =
k−1∏
i=0
(1− qi)qk = 2−k−2
and E(1/Xt2k+2) = 1, it follows that E(Z1) = E(Z0). Therefore (Ztn)n∈N∪{∞} is a uni-
formly integrable martingale such that ZS1 is a martingale. Consequently, dQ
dP
:= Z1 defines
an equivalent martingale measure Q, which shows NFLVR.
Step 3: Suppose that the investor has logarithmic utility and initial endowment 1. Since
1/S1 is a local martingale, it follows that holding one share of S1 is an optimal strategy in
the market S1 (cf. [11], Lemma 2.3).
Let us now introduce a European claim with payoff H := 1{κ0=∞}. Suppose that there
exists some neutral derivative price process S2 for H . We will show in Step 4 that this
leads to a contradiction. By absence of arbitrage S2 must be [0, 1]-valued and (0, 1]-valued
before σ because S21 = H may still end up positive with positive probability. From σ on, S
2
obviously equals 0 unless σ = 1.
Since S1 is the wealth process of an optimal strategy, both S2/S1 and −S2/S1 are
supermartingales by [1], Proposition 4.3. From S1t2k+2 = S
1
t2k+1
it follows that
E(S2t2k+2 − S2t2k+1 |Ft2k+1) = 0 (3.2)
for any k ∈ N.
Step 4: Define a process V by
V0 := 0,
Vt2k+1 :=
{
1− 24
(1+2−k)(1+3/2k−1) if t2k+1 < σ ∧ τ,
1 otherwise,
Vt2k+2 :=
{
1− 24
(1+2−k−1)(1+3/2k−1) if t2k+1 < σ ∧ τ,
1 otherwise,
V1 := 1
for k ∈ N. Moreover, we denote by ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) a trading strategy for (S1, S2) with ϕ = 0
on ]]σ ∧ τ, 1]]. On [[0, σ ∧ τ ]] it is defined via
ϕt1 := (1, 0),
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ϕt2k+1 :=
(
24 · 2k
(1 + 2−k)(1 + 2−k+2)
, 0
)
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,
ϕt2k+2 :=
(
0,
−24
(1 + 2−k)(1 + 3/2k−1)S2t2k+1
)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
Using (3.2) one verifies by straightforward induction that V is the wealth process for ϕ
corresponding to initial capital 0. Since V is bounded from below by −23, the strategy ϕ
is an arbitrage, which implies that the maximal expected logarithmic utility in the extended
market (S1, S2) is infinite. Consequently, S2 cannot be a neutral price process.
Remark 3.5 The value process of the arbitrage strategy in the previous example is a local
Q-martingale for all Q ∈ Q. But it is not a Q-supermartingale although it is bounded from
below. The strategy can be interpreted as an investment in a sequence of nonnegative claims
Y n with 〈Qs, Y n〉 = 0.
Let us have a look at how the situation changes if admissible strategies are by definition
assumed to have nonnegative wealth v+ψ • S in the whole interval [0, T ]. It is an interesting
question whether neutral price processes generally exist in this slightly different context. If
such a modified neutral price process exists in the previous example, it leads to arbitrage.
Indeed, in any market without arbitrage opportunities, the two notions of admissibility result
in the same optimal strategies because the more general admissible portfolios in this paper
are assigned expected utility −∞. Since we consider arbitrage as unacceptable for any
reasonable valuation approach, we do not discuss the above question further.
4 Neutral pricing for utility functions on R
In this section we consider utility functions which are finite on the whole real line, the
prime example being exponential utility u(x) = −e−x. The general setup is as in the first
two paragraphs of Section 2. We assume that investors are identical utility maximizers
with initial endowment v ∈ R. Their preferences are modelled by a continuously differen-
tiable, strictly concave utility function u : R → R which satisfies limx→−∞ u′(x) = ∞ and
u′(∞) = limx→∞ u′(x) = 0. For this type of utility functions the proper choice of the set
of admissible trading strategies is a delicate issue. On the one hand one should allow for
terminal wealths unbounded from below as utility is finite everywhere. On the other hand
some stochastic credit line is needed in order to exclude e.g. favourable doubling strategies.
We work in the setup of [2], which extends and generalizes earlier work to the case of
possibly non-locally bounded processes. The idea is to consider W -admissible strategies
ϕ ∈ L(S) in the sense that the process ϕ • S is bounded from below by −cW for some
c ∈ R+. Here, W ≥ 1 denotes some u-compatible and S-suitable random variable. The
results are independent of its particular choice. u-compatibility means that E(u(−cW )) >
13
−∞ for any c ∈ R+. W is called S-suitable if for any i = 1, . . . ,m + n there exists some
H ∈ L(Si) such that {H = 0} is evanescent and
−W ≤ H • Si ≤ W. (4.1)
Since the derivatives price process (Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n) is assumed to be bounded, it suffices
to assume (4.1) for i = 1, . . . ,m. In order to obtain reasonable results, we make two
assumptions on the optimization problem in the underlyings’ market (cf. [2]). Firstly, we
suppose
E
(
Φ
(
λ
dQ
dP
))
<∞ (4.2)
for any λ > 0 and any Q ∈ Q. Here, Φ(y) := supx∈R(u(x) − xy) denotes the convex
conjugate of u and
Q :=
{
Q P : S1, . . . , Sm are Q-σ-martingales and E
(
Φ
(dQ
dP
))
<∞
}
(4.3)
stands for the domain of a dual minimization problem. Moreover, the maximal utility which
is achievable by trading in the underlyings should not be too large, namely
sup
{
E(u(v+ϕ • ST )) : ϕW -admissible with ϕm+1 = . . . = ϕm+n = 0
}
< u(∞). (4.4)
The supremum in (4.4) may not be attained by any W -admissible strategy. But under the
above assumptions we have
sup
{
E(u(v + ϕ • ST )) : ϕ W -admissible with ϕm+1 = . . . = ϕm+n = 0
}
= E(u(v + f ∗))
for a unique random variable
f ∗ ∈ KΦ :=
{
f ∈
⋂
Q∈Q
L1(Q) : EQ(f) ≤ 0,∀Q ∈ Q
}
, (4.5)
which may attain the value ∞ with positive probability (cf. [2], Theorem 1). We call the
measure Q∗ ∈ Q with density
dQ∗
dP
:=
u′(v + f ∗)
E(u′(v + f ∗))
neutral pricing measure. It solves some dual minimization problem and plays a similar role
as the neutral set functions in Definition 2.3.
As in Section 2 neutral pricing is supposed to indicate that trading derivatives does
not increase expected utility. Since the optimal utility in (4.4) may not be attained by W -
admissible trading, we must modify Definition 2.2 slightly.
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Definition 4.1 We call a derivatives price process (Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n) neutral price process
if
sup
{
E(u(v + ϕ • ST )) : ϕ W -admissible
}
= sup
{
E(u(v + ϕ • ST )) : ϕ W -admissible with ϕm+1 = . . . = ϕm+n = 0
}
.(4.6)
Theorem 4.2 The set of neutral price processes (Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n) coincides with the set
of derivative price processes that are Q∗-martingales with terminal value (H1, . . . , Hn). If
they exist, neutral price processes are unique up to Q∗-indistinguishability or, equivalently,
up to P -indistinguishability on the set {Z 6= 0}, where Z denotes the density process of Q∗
relative to P .
PROOF. Suppose that (Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n) is a neutral derivatives price process. Define Q˜ and
K˜Φ as in (4.3) and (4.5) but corresponding to the large market, i.e. such that Si, i ≤ m + n
rather than only Si, i ≤ m are required to be Q-σ-martingales. Obviously, we have Q˜ ⊂ Q
and KΦ ⊂ K˜Φ. From
sup
{
E(u(v + ϕ • ST )) : ϕ W -admissible
}
= E(u(v + f ∗))
and Theorem 1 in [2] it follows that Q∗ ∈ Q˜. Therefore Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n are Q∗-σ-martin-
gales and hence Q∗-martingales because they are bounded. In particular, they are up to Q∗-
indistinguishability unique.
In order to show the converse, let Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n be semimartingales which are at
the same time bounded Q∗-martingales with terminal values H1, . . . , Hn. If we define Q˜
and K˜Φ as in the first part of the proof, we have Q∗ ∈ Q˜ because Sm+1, . . . , Sm+n are
Q∗-martingales. Estimation (11) in [2] yields that
sup
{
E(u(v + ϕ • ST )) : ϕ W -admissible
}
< u(∞).
Moreover, Q∗ solves the dual minimization problem in [2] both onQ and on the smaller set
Q˜, which implies that the optimal value of the utility maximization problem in the small
and in the large market coincide (cf. [2], Theorem 1). Put differently, Equation (4.6) holds.

If Q contains some measure which is equivalent to P , then Q∗ ∼ P for the neutral
pricing measure above (cf. Remark 2 in [2]). In this case, neutral price processes exist and
they are unique up to P -indistinguishability. But even in the general case the non-uniqueness
in Theorem 4.2 is of a different kind than the one in Theorem 2.5. In the latter case, it is
due to non-uniqueness of the dual minimizer. Here, however, non-unique prices are caused
by non-equivalence of P and Q∗. Ambiguous option prices occur only on the set where the
density process of Q∗ relative to P vanishes. On this set you are infinitely rich at T , which
implies that you do not care about additional profit. If the initial σ-field F0 is trivial, the
initial prices (Sm+10 , . . . , S
m+n
0 ) are unique.
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In arbitrage-free discrete-time markets (i.e. with time domain {0, 1, . . . , T}) satisfying
(4.2) and (4.4), unique neutral derivative prices exist. Indeed, by the fundamental theorem
of asset pricing (cf. [4]) there exists some martingale measureQ ∼ P with bounded density.
Since Φ is continuous with limx→0Φ(x) = u(∞), this implies Q ∈ Q and hence Q∗ ∼ P if
u(∞) <∞. If u(∞) =∞, the equivalence Q∗ ∼ P holds by Remark 2 in [2].
The following example shows that neutral price processes may fail to exist in con-
tinuous time. The point is that no version of the Q∗-martingale in Theorem 4.2 is a P -
semimartingale.
Example 4.3 We consider a single underlying S1 with time horizon T = 1. The stock S1
grows linearly according to S1t = 1 + t up to a random jump time τ where it has a jump of
size∆S1τ = −(1− τ) and stops, i.e. remains constant afterwards. We start by modelling S1
under probability measure Q. Relative to Q the jump intensity at time t is supposed to be
λt := 1/(1 − t). Since
∫ 1
0
λtdt = ∞, we have that the stock jumps Q-almost surely. One
easily verifies that S1 is a Q-martingale. Moreover, we have
Q(τ > t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λsds
)
= 1− t
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and, more generally,
Q(τ > t|τ > s) = 1− t
1− s
for 0 ≤ s < t ≤ 1.
We consider an investor with initial endowment v = 0 and exponential utility function
u(x) = −e−x. We chooseW = 1 for the definition of admissibility. Define a deterministic
trading strategy
ϕt :=
1
2(1− t) ,
which leads to the wealth process
Vt := ϕ • S
1
t =
{ −1
2
log(1− t) for t < τ
−1
2
log(1− τ)− 1
2
for t ≥ τ.
In particular, we have
EQ(exp(VT )) =
∫ 1
0
exp
(
− 1
2
log(1− t)− 1
2
)
dt =
2√
e
.
Finally, we define the objective probability measure P by its density
dP
dQ
:=
√
e
4
exp(VT ).
Note that EQ(dPdQ) = 1/2 < 1, which means that P is not a probability measure yet. The
missing mass 1/2 is assigned to the path where no jump happens, which means that P
becomes a true probability measure with Q P . Note that
dQ
dP
=
4√
e
u′(VT ) (4.7)
16
holds also on the set {τ < 1}C and hence P -almost surely. Dominated convergence yields
Vt → VT in L1(Q) for t → T , which implies EQ(VT ) = 0. For any W -admissible ψ we
have
EP
(
u(ψ • S1T )
) ≤ EP (u(VT )) + EP (u′(VT )(ψ • S1T − VT ))
= EP (u(VT )) +
√
e
4
(
EQ(ψ • S
1
T )− EQ(VT )
)
≤ EP (u(VT )) < u(∞). (4.8)
Consequently, (4.4) holds. Condition (4.2) is generally satisfied for exponential utility by
[2], Section 2.2. Since V is bounded from below and Vt ∈ KΦ for any t < T , Fatou’s
lemma yields VT ∈ KΦ. By (4.8) this implies that f ∗ := VT is the optimal payoff of the
utility maximization problem. (4.7) yields that Q is the neutral pricing measure for this
market model.
Consider now a contingent claim with payoff
H :=
{
1 for τ ∈ ⋃k=1,3,5,...(tk−1, tk]
0 for τ ∈ ⋃k=2,4,6,...(tk−1, tk] ∪ {τ < 1}C
where tk := 1 − 3−k. Suppose that S2 is a neutral price process for H and hence a Q-
martingale by Theorem 4.2. If k is odd, we have
S2tk−1 = EQ(H|Ftk−1)
= Q(H = 1|τ > tk−1)
≥ Q(τ ≤ tk|τ > tk−1)
= 1− 3
−k
3−k+1
=
2
3
on the set {τ > tk−1}. Similarly, one concludes that S2tk−1 ≤ 1/3 on the set {τ > tk−1}
if k is even. Consequently, S2 oscillates infinitely often between 1/3 and 2/3 on the set
{τ < 1}C , which has positive probability under P . On this set S2 cannot have a left-hand
limit in t = 1. This in turn implies that it cannot be a P -semimartingale in contradiction to
the definition of a derivative price process.
A close examination of the above example reveals that it allows for free lunch with
vanishing risk under P . However, by slight modification one can turn it into a market
satisfying NFLVR. One could e.g. modify the jump distribution by letting
∆S1t :=
{
−(1− t) with jump intensity 1
2(1−t)
−1 with jump intensity 1
2
,
under Q, which removes free lunches also under P . One may then proceed similarly as
above with ϕt := 14(1−t) and tk := 1− 9−k. We leave the somewhat tedious technical details
to the reader.
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Remark 4.4 Let us abandon the assumption that the payoffs H i are bounded and assume
instead that any H i can be sub- and superhedged by a strategy in the underlyings. More
precisely, we suppose
k + (ϕ1, . . . , ϕm) • (S1, . . . , Sm)T ≤ H i ≤ l + (ψ1, . . . , ψm) • (S1, . . . , Sm)T (4.9)
for some k, l ∈ R and some (S1, . . . , Sm)-integrable (ϕ1, . . . , ϕm), (ψ1, . . . , ψm) such that
(ϕ1, . . . , ϕm) • (S1, . . . , Sm) and (ψ1, . . . , ψm) • (S1, . . . , Sm) are true Q∗-martingales.
Accordingly, we only suppose
k + (ϕ1, . . . , ϕm) • (S1, . . . , Sm) ≤ Si ≤ l + (ψ1, . . . , ψm) • (S1, . . . , Sm) (4.10)
instead of boundedness in the definition of a derivatives price process (cf. the second para-
graph of Section 2). Then Theorem 4.2 continues to hold. This follows by combining
arguments from the proofs of Corollary 3.5 in [17] and Theorem 4.2 above. From (4.10)
one can conclude thatW remains suitable in the enlarged market.
Condition (4.10) for k, l, (ϕ1, . . . , ϕm), (ψ1, . . . , ψm) satisfying (4.9) is a kind of reason-
ability condition for derivative price processes which appears similarly in [17]. Note that
the implication (4.9)⇒(4.10) does not follow from usual no-arbitrage arguments.
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